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Introduction
The ethical conduct of US military service members engaged in combat operations in Iraq or Afghanistan came to the forefront of public attention with the events of Abu Ghraib (2004), Haditha (2006) , and other highly publicised cases. 1, 2 In some of these cases, including recent allegations of murder of non-combatants by a sniper team in Iraq and a group of soldiers in a Stryker unit, unethical conduct has been attributed to the stresses of combat or post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 3, 4 Unethical conduct has been a concern in previous wars.
In 2006, ethical issues were included for the fi rst time in the annual theatre-wide Mental Health Assessment Team (MHAT) survey of the wellbeing of US soldiers deployed in Iraq. 5 The survey specifi cally addressed the issue of battlefi eld ethics and the adequacy of battlefi eldethics training in the preparation of soldiers for combat operations in Iraq. The 2006 MHAT survey showed that less than 50% of soldiers were willing to report a member of their unit for ethical violations, 13% reported damaging a non-combatant's personal property, and 6% reported hitting or kicking non-combatants unnecessarily (table 1) . 5 Additionally, soldiers with high levels of combat exposure or who met criteria for PTSD reported high levels of unethical conduct, although a systematic statistical analysis of factors associated with ethical misconduct was not reported. 5 The fi ndings of the MHAT survey led to a recommendation for the development of a battlefi eld-ethics training programme. However, at the time of the next MHAT survey in mid 2007, no systematic training programme had been developed, and the 2007 MHAT assessment showed levels of unethical conduct similar to that reported in the 2006 survey (table 1) . 6 The unchanged levels of unethical conduct reported in the 2007 MHAT survey prompted the Commanding General of the Multi-National Division-Center in Iraq to develop and implement a battlefi eld-ethics training This article is a U.S. government work, and is not subject to copyright in the United States.
programme for all soldiers under his command. In response to the Commander's directive, a training development team was created, which was led by the Division Psychiatrist with representatives for the Staff Judge Advocate (legal), Division Surgeon (medical), Adjutant (personnel), and Chaplain. During the training development, experts in the specialties of both military and civilian ethics training were consulted.
The team did a review of military and medical reports and publications about ethical training, international humanitarian law, civilian protection in war, and combat stress behaviours. Many reports discussed the importance of ethical behaviour on the battlefi eld, the eff ect of violations, and the infl uence of group conformity and obedience on decision making in ethical dilemmas. [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] One report 13 cited a need for systematic training, noting that it should be a continuing process, and suggested that training should focus on enhancing moral reasoning and judgment and instilling particular values (eg, integrity, professionalism, responsibility). Reports preferentially focused on treatment of prisoners of war, ethical issues related to the provision of medical care, or scenarios with high ambiguity for which one could make strong arguments both for or against particular decisions (eg, whether to shoot an innocent child or risk the child revealing the location of soldiers on a secret mission behind enemy lines). 14, 15 However, few studies presented models for eff ective education with routine scenarios involving non-combatants encountered by soldiers on a day-to-day basis, and no specifi c outcome measures existed that were relevant to current operations in Iraq or Afghanistan until the publication of the MHAT survey results. Additionally, data about factors associated with battlefi eld ethical violations were scarce, which might inform training eff orts.
This review led to the development and implementation of a practical, scenario-based, battlefi eld-ethics training programme for use in theatre. We aimed to assess the eff ectiveness of the battlefi eld-ethics training programme, and to establish whether a change occurred in soldiers' reports of how they treated non-combatants, attitudes towards unethical conduct, and their willingness to report ethical violations. We also assessed the association of PTSD, combat exposure, and other variables with unethical conduct on the battlefi eld.
Methods

Study design and participants
The training programme was developed in October, 2007, and implemented between Dec 11, 2007, and Jan 30, 2008 . We compared the answers from anonymous cross-sectional surveys done before and after battlefi eld-ethics training in randomly selected soldiers from one brigade combat team during a 15-month deployment to Iraq (total brigade population about 3500). The pre-training survey included all respondents from the brigade who had participated in the annual theatre-wide MHAT survey in August, 2007, about 3-4 months into a 15-month deployment and before the training was undertaken. Training was given 7-8 months into the deployment, and then the second cross-sectional survey was administered by the study investigators 3-4 months after the training with the same methods used in the 2007 MHAT survey. In addition to the MHAT questions, we included questions to assess the training and factors associated with unethical conduct. To ensure comparable 3-month observation periods, survey questions asked before training referred to behaviours occurring since the beginning of deployment. Questions asked after training referred to behaviours in the most recent 3 months of the deployment. Permission to undertake this study was obtained from the in-theatre 16, 17 The focus of the training related to concerns identifi ed in the MHAT surveys or serious violations that had come to media attention (eg, treatment of non-combatants, looting and pillaging, killing non-combatants, Rules of Engagement, and willingness to report ethical violations). 5, 6 In the 2007 MHAT focus groups, many soldiers reported a desire to hear from those who had previously Summary • Task: conduct battlefi eld-ethics training.
• Format: video or slide directed discussion in a leader-led chain-teaching format.
• Purpose: to promote adherence, protect against unnecessary suff ering and collateral damage, and to promote the humane treatment of non-combatants.
• Conditions: leaders are provided with a training disc with slides and videos and a script of key talking points to discuss in each section. Total training time is 60-90 min. 
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Reporting ethical violations
• Scene (movie clip: Home of the Brave; start 11 min 45 s, length 2 min): soldiers are involved in a continuing urban battle where a civilian is wounded and killed in the fog of war.
• Key discussion items: data about soldiers' willingness to report potential violations and attitudes towards investigations; the importance of soldiers' understanding that investigations after combat incidents are not just about determining wrong-doing but are also about providing reassurance that the proper steps and actions are taken, and garnering the lessons that can be learned.
Warning signs and protective factors
• Warning signs and associated factors contributing toward unethical behaviour: use of drugs and alcohol, high combat exposure, unaddressed mental health problems, poor equal-opportunity climate, failure of expected support, poor unit cohesion, low confi dence in unit leadership. • Protective factors: leadership, high unit cohesion, early recognition and addressing of combat operational stress, sleep, rest and refi t, eff ective communication, after-action debriefi ng.
Panel 1:
Overview of the in-theatre battlefi eld-ethics training programme deployed and from their unit leaders about how they should handle ethical dilemmas. 6 Furthermore, many soldiers reported that they did not fi nd behavioural training with "typical powerpoint briefi ngs" eff ective. 6 Consequently, the training that was developed consisted of a leader-led interactive programme with brief video vignettes to highlight key learning points and serve as starting points for discussions. A military legal review permitted the use of clips from popular movies for this educational purpose, and unit commanders approved the content.
The division implemented a chain-teaching format in which senior leaders taught their immediate subordinate leaders. The subordinate leaders then taught their own subordinate leaders until the training involved all military personnel. Training sessions were done in small groups to promote discussion among those who served in combat together. To ensure that the training was standardised throughout, unit leaders were provided with a script that included key questions and discussion points for each video vignette. The leaders were encouraged to link these discussions to current situations and issues that the unit was facing. An overview of the training programme is provided in panel 1.
For the pre-training comparison sample, 397 soldiers were identifi ed as belonging to the study brigade from a total of 2195 who completed MHAT surveys in brigades throughout theatre. These soldiers were identifi ed on the basis of unit identifi ers in the otherwise anonymous MHAT survey database. 6 This dataset, gathered 3-4 months into the brigade's deployment, contained only the responses to demographic, combat exposure, and battlefi eld-ethics questions from the larger MHAT survey.
The sampling methods of the 2007 MHAT survey have been described previously. 6 Briefl y, 25 soldiers from randomly selected line and support companies within brigade combat teams throughout Iraq were selected. Although most of the MHAT data gathered in Iraq allowed for convenience sampling in randomly selected companies, a random method of soldier selection in each of the selected companies was used in the brigade chosen for this study, on the basis of the last four digits of each soldier's social security number. Soldiers who were approached for participation in the MHAT survey were informed of the voluntary and anonymous nature of the survey, which was administered according to a protocol approved by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research institutional review board. 6 For the recruitment of participants to the post-training sample, which was done with a protocol approved by the in-theatre institutional review board, 500 soldiers were randomly selected from the same brigade that participated in the 2007 MHAT study with the same random selection methods. Specifi cally, 25 soldiers were selected from each Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, and Delta companies of the fi ve subordinate battalions within the brigade, for a total of 500. All soldiers for whom the last four numbers of their social security numbers began with 3, 6, or 9 had their names placed on individual cards in a container with no identifi ers visible and 25 were drawn from the container. Once identifi ed, the selected soldiers were approached by the unit's medical provider and invited to complete an anonymous paper survey. Soldiers were informed that participation was voluntary, would remain anonymous, and that their participation or nonparticipation would have no negative eff ect on them. To ensure the anonymity of participants in the study, no personal identifying information was collected on the survey and the completed surveys were placed in a sealed envelope and locked drop box at the medical aid station, which was accessible only by the investigators. Because this survey was anonymous, a requirement for signed consent was waived, and completion of the survey was classed as consent.
Both surveys, done before and after battlefi eld-ethics training, included the same questions related to ethical behaviour and reporting of ethical violations, combat exposure, and demographic information (age, rank, sex, education, deployment history, time spent outside the forward operating base). 5, 6 The PTSD checklist-military (PCL-M) 17 and the patient health questionnaire (PHQ) 9, which have been validated and widely used in military and veteran populations, were used to assess for PTSD and depression in the soldiers who completed the survey after training. [18] [19] [20] [21] Additionally, nine statements about soldiers' attitudes towards the battlefi eld-ethics chain-teaching programme were included in the post-training survey.
The combat exposure section included 15 statements in which respondents were asked how many times a series of combat events occurred during deployment, with a fi ve-point response from 1 (never) to 5 (10 times or more) for each event. The sections on ethical behaviours and reporting of ethical violations included a subset of the questions from the 2007 MHAT survey in which respondents were asked to rate seven questions, on a fi ve-point scale from 1 (never) to 5 (fi ve times or more), about how often they engaged in a specifi c unethical behaviour in the past 90 days. Additionally, the soldiers were asked to rate how much they disagree or agree with an additional 11 statements about attitudes toward reporting ethical violations on a fi ve-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Questions related to ethical conduct focused on attitudes and specifi c behaviours that were somewhat subjective (ie, insulting non-combatants, damaging property, or hitting or kicking a non-combatant "when it was not necessary"), to encourage honest reporting on the anonymous surveys, as had been done in previous MHAT surveys.
The PCL-M is a 17-item self-report checklist, directly adapted from the PTSD criteria in the Diagnostic and Statisical Manual IV. The checklist is keyed specifi cally to stressful military experiences. Soldiers were asked to rate how much they have been bothered in the past month by various experiences on a fi ve-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). Scoring was accomplished by summing the responses of each question with the total score ranging from 17 to 85. The PCL-M has been validated and widely used in military populations, and a score of 50 or greater has been deemed optimum for the identifi cation of PTSD in population-level research. 18, 19 The PHQ 9 is a nine item, self-administered version of the depression module of the primary care evaluation of mental disorders. 20 This test assesses the nine diagnostic criteria for depression on a scale 0 (not at all) to 3 (nearly every day) and is used widely in the military. 21 When the test is used for screening, the individual responses are summed (scale range 0-34). Scores of 5, 10, 15, and 20 have high reliability and validity for mild, moderate, moderately severe, and severe depression, and a cutoff of 10 was selected for this study.
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Statistical analyses
All data were entered into an SPSS (version 12.02) database. The primary focus was on descriptive statistics including the reported rates of ethical behaviours among soldiers, willingness to report ethical violations, prevalence of probable PTSD on the basis of the established cutoff scores on the PCL-M, prevalence of depressive symptoms on the basis of the PHQ 9, and number of combat exposures. Pre-training and post-training survey responses were compared using chi-square analyses.
We developed two logistic regression models using self-reported unethical behaviours as dependent variables, including soldiers' participation in insulting or cursing at non-combatants and mistreatment of non-combatants (defi ned as either unnecessary damage or destruction of non-combatant property or unnecessarily hitting or kicking non-combatants). The independent variables that were assessed included age (less than 25 vs 25 years or older), sex, rank, completion of previous combat deployments (any vs none), highest level of education, current symptoms suggestive of depression or PTSD, time spent outside the forward operating base (greater than 20 h per week versus 20 h or less per week), and a sum of combat exposures. Both individual associations between dependent and independent variables and adjusted associations were assessed.
Role of the funding source
No industry grants or fi nancial support were used in this project. Study design, data collection, data analysis, data interpretation, and writing of the report were completed entirely by the study investigators and they had full access to all data in the study. The corresponding author had full access to all data in the study and had fi nal responsibility to submit for publication.
Results
The training was completed in all brigades under the Multi-National Division-Center Iraq, including about 3500 soldiers in the brigade combat team selected for this study. Of these soldiers, 500 were randomly selected to participate in the post-training survey, and 421 (84%) voluntarily chose to participate. The sample included mostly male enlisted soldiers, who were on acknowledged completing the unit battlefi eld-ethics training programme, which was consistent with training logs kept by the brigade that showed 100% compliance with the training requirement. More than half reported that they had either been attacked or ambushed or knew someone who had been injured or killed in Iraq (table 2) . Chi-square analyses showed that the pre-training and post-training groups had comparable demographics, mental health concerns, and time outside the forward operating base. The post-training group had higher levels of several combat experiences than did the pre-training group, which was an expected fi nding. More than a fi fth of post-training survey respondents met screening criteria for depression or PTSD, which was comparable to the prevalence in the pre-training sample (table 2) . 42 (10%) soldiers met screening criteria for PTSD as defi ned by a PCL-M score of 50 or higher, while 79 (19%) had symptoms of depression as defi ned by a PHQ-9 score of 10 or higher. The mean PCL-M score was 28·6 (SD 14·0, 95% CI 27·3-29·9) and the mean PHQ 9 score was 4·8 (SD 5·6, 95% CI 4·2-5·4). A third of participants reported that they spent more than 20 h per week outside the forward operating base, which was comparable to that before training (table 2) Table 3 compares the ethical attitudes and behaviours reported by soldiers 3-4 months after training completion and those reported before training (which referred to the 3-4 month period from the beginning of the deployment). Signifi cant increases were seen in soldiers' perceptions of their preparedness for encountering non-combatants (table 3) . Decreased rates of unethical conduct were noted in all categories after training, with signifi cant reductions in reports of insulting or cursing at non-combatants, unnecessary damage or destruction of private property, or witnessing mistreatment by a fellow unit member. Signifi cant reductions were seen in all categories of attitudes related to reporting of a fellow soldier for ethical misconduct (table 3) . Data are number (%; 95% CI) unless stated otherwise. *N=397. †N=421.
Table 3: Association of battlefi eld-ethics training with ethical attitudes and behaviours of soldiers
When the post-training ethical behaviours were examined, about a fi fth of soldiers responded that they had participated in insulting or cursing at non-combatants, compared with about a third of those before training; reports of damaging or destroying private property when it was not necessary decreased from nearly 14% to 5%, and reports of witnessing brutality or mistreatment of noncombatants by a unit member decreased from nearly 9% to 3% (table 3) . Signifi cant increases were seen in the willingness of soldiers to report ethical violations (table 3) .
The unadjusted univariate logistic regression models (table 4) showed that a positive screening for PTSD or depression, spending more than 20 h outside the forward operating base, and high-intensity combat (on the basis of the exposure score) all showed signifi cant associations with mistreatment of non-combatants (ie, unnecessary damage to property or unnecessarily hitting or kicking non-combatants). However, when these associations were adjusted in a model that combined these variables together with demographics (age, sex, rank, education, and history of prior deployment), only combat exposure remained a signifi cant predictor of mistreatment of non-combatants. PTSD, time outside the base-camp, and combat exposure did predict yelling and cursing at non-combatants, although combat exposure again greatly attenuated the strength of these associations in adjusted analyses.
The fi gure outlines the soldiers' attitudes towards the training programme. Most considered the format to be PHQ 9=patient health questionnaire 9. PTSD=post-traumatic stress disorder. PCL-M=PTSD checklist-military. *Adjusted analyses included depression, PTSD, time working outside the forward operating base, combat exposure, and demographics (age, sex, prior deployment, rank, and education). eff ective and nearly two-thirds noted that they learned what actions to take and understood the eff ect that ethical violations can have on a unit's mission. We did subgroup analyses to compare the perceptions of training with PTSD, time outside the operating base, and combat exposures; no signifi cant diff erences or trends were noted in any of these analyses.
Discussion
Results from our assessment of the battlefi eld-ethics training programme suggest that soldiers' behaviours and attitudes towards the treatment of non-combatants can be positively infl uenced through leader-led training discussions (panel 2). The conduct of US military personnel on the battlefi eld has potential far-reaching consequences on tactical mission eff ectiveness and the strategic success of entire operations with coalition partners. Two past surveys done during the Iraq deployment in 2006 and 2007, suggested that 13-14% of US soldiers reported damaging or destroying private property and 6% reported hitting or kicking a noncombatant when it was not necessary (table 1) . 5, 6 This type of behaviour has serious moral and legal ramifi cations, and can damage military relations with local populations and jeopardise the ability of the US and coalition forces from other nations to achieve military objectives.
One of the important fi ndings of our study is that PTSD was not associated with unethical conduct after controlling for combat experiences. The intensity of direct combat seemed to be the strongest predictor of unethical conduct, which is borne out also by many anecdotes of combat veterans who describe intense and sometimes uncontrollable rage in association with horrifi c events, such as losing a close team member. 22 The soldiers who spent more than 20 h per week outside the fortifi ed and protected forward operating bases averaged a greater number of combat exposures than did those who spent less time outside the base. This group also interacted more frequently with the civilian populace, placing them in situations where noncombatant mistreatment could occur. The results suggest that training in battlefi eld ethics should be prioritised, especially for those units expected to engage in highintensity direct combat and who will have the most interaction with the civilian, non-combatant population.
The degree to which ethical attitudes and reported behaviours could be modifi ed through training is an encouraging fi nding. The training was well received by soldiers. The brief video clips provided a framework for discussion of topics relevant to the day-to-day scenarios that these soldiers were encountering, sometimes including ambiguous and diffi cult ethical dilemmas. The chain teaching provided a method for unit leaders to give guidance on how they expected their subordinates to respond to ethically challenging situations and also allowed for direct discussion between participants about situations they had actually encountered in their work. Furthermore, the leaders' personal engagement in the training emphasised the priority of the topic, and modelled what was expected throughout the rest of the deployment. The use of a script ensured that the key teaching points were delivered consistently across the diff erent leader-led discussions.
Further studies are needed to refi ne the battlefi eld-ethics training methods, improve the sustainability and reproducibility of the training eff ects, and establish the most eff ective training implementation plans. On the basis of the initial feedback used in this intervention, we strongly suggest that future training includes engagement of unit leaders with their subordinates on these issues. The use of popular movie clips seemed to be helpful in facilitating discussion. However, the success of this programme was probably not related to the specifi c vignettes selected, but rather to the discussion by leaders that led to a cultural change in which unit awareness of ethical issues and leadership expectations improved.
An important limitation of this study was the absence of a randomised or experimental design, which was not possible in the operational environment, and therefore the outcomes and conclusions were observational and dependent on the comparability of the pre-training and post-training samples. Data from both samples were gathered from within the same unit with the same random sampling methods, and with comparable timeframes of reference. Analysis confi rmed that data for demographics and exposure to direct combat of the two samples were comparable, which was also representative of the theatre-wide MHAT survey sample. Soldiers' perceptions of training, including the use of movie vignettes and leader-led discussions, were positive, with many soldiers attributing improved understanding of how to handle ethical dilemmas to training.
Soldiers' attitudes could have changed during deployment because of experience or time in theatre, and not
Panel 2: Research in context
Systematic review
We searched both military reports and MEDLINE for reports published between Jan 1, 1970, and Oct 1, 2007, with the search terms "military ethics", "battlefi eld ethics", "combat ethics", "soldier ethics", "ethics education", "ethical training", "treatment of non-combatants", "international humanitarian law", "civilian protection in war", and "combat stress".
Interpretation
Our fi ndings have important implications for how military leaders prepare their forces for military operations ranging from peacekeeping to combat. Furthermore, unethical battlefi eld conduct was associated with high-intensity combat but not with PTSD, countering a commonly held belief that PTSD is a cause of such behaviour. Additional studies are needed to refi ne, disseminate, and further assess the eff ectiveness of battlefi eld-ethics training.
directly because of training. However, previous theatrewide MHAT surveys showed no improvement in ethical attitudes and behaviour associated with time in theatre. 6 Furthermore, the relation between unethical behaviours and number of combat exposures would suggest an expected worsening in attitudes and behaviour with increased time in theatre because of the likelihood of additional exposure rather than the recorded improvement in this sample.
Linkage of pre-training and post-training responses for individual soldiers and control for possible confounding from temporal changes in responses (eg, improved attitudes over time as a result of experience in theatre, independent of training) was not possible because of the anonymous nature of reporting. However, an additional post-hoc analysis of all soldiers who completed the 2007 MHAT survey showed that longer time in theatre was associated with higher rates of unethical behaviours and reduced willingness to report a team member for mistreatment of a non-combatant (Col Paul Bliese, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Silver Spring, MD, USA, personal communication). 6 Thus, the signifi cant improvement in outcomes seen between pretraining and post-training assessments in the study brigade is particularly noteworthy.
Another study limitation is the reliance on selfreported measures and the subjectivity of some of the questions (eg, which behaviours soldiers perceived as "necessary" in the combat environment). However, the consistency and strength of associations across the various outcome measures supports the conclusion that the training had a positive eff ect on both ethical attitudes and actual behaviours.
Individuals might have underreported misconduct, avoided participation in the survey out of fear that they might face disciplinary action if their survey responses were identifi able, or responded in a manner that was perceived as desirable to the unit leaders and military environment. However, the anonymous reporting, precautions to ensure that surveys were not accessible to unit peers or leaders, and use of questions that focused on attitudes and somewhat subjective behaviours probably encouraged honest reporting. Evidence suggests that soldiers are much more willing to report sensitive mental-health concerns on anonymous surveys than in screening surveys used in non-anonymous confi dential clinical settings. 23 Furthermore, soldiers' responses were consistent in this study sample as compared with previous theatre-wide anonymous surveys, which used the same questions. The survey sampling design and protection of soldiers' identities with anonymous surveys were identical for the pretraining and post-training groups, and the post-training survey was administered 3-4 months after training rather than in close proximity. Therefore, diff erences attributable to social desirability or diff erent levels of concern about anonymity are unlikely.
Our fi nding that battlefi eld-ethics training with leaderled discussions positively infl uenced soldiers' behaviours and attitudes towards the treatment of non-combatants has implications for the conduct of many peacekeeping and combat operations worldwide. Although battlefi eld ethical conduct is judged to be crucial to mission success, and training is increasingly being included in the curriculum of military organisations internationally, 7, 13, 24 we are not aware of any other systematic programme assessment. The results of this study can inform training programmes worldwide, including a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) initiative, chartered in 2009, to develop and implement moral dilemma training for all NATO forces. 25 Our study is the fi rst published study to provide both potential methods for preventing unethical conduct and associated factors for unethical battlefi eld conduct.
Emphasis should be placed on training those with high levels of combat exposure, and should include experientially-based leader-led discussions.
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